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INTRODUCTION

Setting speakers and sitting secrets
In September 1995, upon obtaining a $3 million grant from the National Office of Housing and Urban Design (HUD), five nonprofit social service agencies in a Midwestern city banded together to establish an array of programs for local homeless women and their children. Titled the "Homeless Family Consortium" (HFC), this collaborative venture was inspired by local social workers' consensus that homeless mothers had been abandoned by the area's social service networks, particularly in regard to drug treatment. Thus, HFC designated a large portion of the garnered grant funds to Fresh Beginnings, an intensive outpatient program designed specifically for the treatment of drug-using homeless women.' From its inception, Fresh Beginnings defined itself against "traditional" treatexamine these metalinguistic claims and the language ideology that informs them. I demonstrate that therapists' claims about language are consistent with the IDE-OLOGY OF INNER REFERENCE, an ideology that presumes (i) that "healthy" language refers to preexisting phenomena, and (ii) that the phenomena to which it refers are internal to speakers.
According to the ideology of inner reference, language works when the radical split between signified and signifier is bridged by the process of signification as the speaker chooses the words that correspond to discrete, preexistent inner referents.5 In the context of contemporary American drug treatment, language that refers in such a way is also thought to dramatically to transform. Specifically, recovery tales -sometimes called "drunkalogs" -effectively link the denotational and the transformational, not just because their linear plotlines proceed from a denoted dirty past to an anticipated clean future (that is, on the level of narrative structure), but also because their very performance ideally entails the reflexively instrumental use of ostensibly self-referential language. Indeed, Fresh Beginnings therapists posited that words could only heal the client-speaker to the extent that they revealed her.6
Some organizational theorists have argued that institutions are cultures with languages and ideologies of their own; however, the ideology of inner reference was neither the exclusive province of the Fresh Beginnings program nor the invention of the therapists whose metalinguistic claims so clearly articulated it. The ideology of reference, which works to confine language's function to the reference of preexisting people, ideas, and things, is the dominant language ideology of Euro-Americans (Silverstein 1979 (Silverstein , 1981 (Silverstein , 1985 Irvine 1989 , Woolard 1998 , Kroskrity 2000 . Arguably, the ideology of inner reference, which further limits the reach of words to the contents of individual psyches, is one that enjoys broad cultural circulation in the contemporary United States. Talk show confessionals, tell-all memoirs, and the sheer pervasiveness of what James Wilce (1998:51) aptly calls "I talk" are compelling evidence that language is widely thought to be a reflection of inner being rather than a manifestation of situated sociality.
A number of scholars have shown that referential language enjoys particular currency in clinical settings and situations. For example, in his ethnography of a Boston homeless shelter where many residents had been diagnosed with mental illnesses, Robert Desjarlais notes that "the staff advanced a way of thinking about language that came close to an ideology dominant in many contemporary Englishspeaking societies which gives priority to the referential, semantic, and propositional functions of language" (1997:180). In his discussions of the poetics of madness in rural Bangladesh, Wilce (1998 Wilce ( , 2004 demonstrates that "sane" others reject linguistic performances that do not accurately denote nonlinguistic facts, especially longed-for "facts" about otherwise puzzling inner states. Allan Young's fascinating study of a psychiatric unit for Vietnam veterans highlights both the clinical demand for patients to verbally disclose the "contents" of their traumaladen memory and the punitive measures reserved for those who do not engage in the work of authentic linguistic representation (1995:214-16). And, of course, in tracing the use of confessional techniques from the early church to the contemporary clinic, Michel Foucault (e.g., 1978 Foucault (e.g., , 1988 Foucault (e.g., , 1993 established the complicity of referential language in the very making of the modem subject.
Yet although Fresh Beginnings' language ideology was shared with its cultural and clinical surrounds, the young program was dedicated to its perfection in practice. Indeed, in making metalinguistic claims, therapists did not simply articulate the ideological premises of inner reference but mobilized those premises as a clinical regimen. Programs like Fresh Beginnings have indeed inherited, ready-made, the idea that "healthy" language functions to denote preexisting psychic and social facts, but the ethnographic observer of American drug treatment cannot help but be struck by the amount of work it takes to guard, protect, and patrol these highly naturalized assumptions. I call such work METALINGUIS-TIC LABOR, arguing that while therapeutic interventions seemed to elicit inner signs that were always already there, awaiting cathartic escape in language, Fresh Beginnings therapy was instead an exercise in linguistic production that required the labor of therapists, the compliance of clients, and the use of particular metalinguistic tools for producing a perfectly transparent language.
Relying largely on data gleaned from extensive interviews with program clients and staff, this essay focuses on one such metalinguistic tool: the frequently evoked acronym "HOW" (Honesty, Openness, Willingness), which therapists used to guide and sanction their clients' talk. As both therapists and clients attest in the excerpts below, "Honest, Open and Willing" talk involved the revelation of particular CONTENT: the sins of the past and the residual shame of the present recounted in linear plotlines aimed toward willful recovery. Yet HOW was also a particular METHOD of speaking, a method that worked to minimize the potential of words to point, protest, or critique rather than merely self-refer. Institutions transmit ideas regarding both discursive content and discursive method (Silverstein & Urban 1996), and although therapists claimed that the contents of clients' consciences, as inner signs to be spoken, demanded particular methods of speaking, it is also certain that the methods of speaking they prescribed elicited particular content.
If Fresh Beginnings was interested in perfecting the language of inner reference and in socializing7 clients in accordance with it, it was largely because the program was dedicated to producing healthy speakers. However, as the case highlighted at the end of this essay clearly illustrates, therapists' metalinguistic labor not only served such therapeutic aims but also bolstered and stabilized Fresh Beginnings as a young institution. Thus, while this article focuses on language as a clinical good, it addresses it as an institutional resource as well. In this sense, my argument proceeds from Gal's (1991:186) assertion that institutions are not simply neutral contexts for talk but are instead organized to demonstrate and enforce the legitimacy of institutional authorities' linguistic strategies (see also Cohn 1987 , Desjarlais 1997 Lemanski 2001 ). According to this thesis, even though active addicts may at first be able to make sense of the world, they are unable to see the causal connection between their life problems and their drug use. For example, in their textbook Substance Abuse, David McDowell and Henry Spitz define denial not only as a "primitive psychological mechanism for dealing with reality," but also as a "focused delusional system" in which the addict avoids the realities that are "obvious to everyone else" ( 1999:121 ).
Since addiction is widely considered a progressive disease in which casual use develops into physical and/or psychological dependency, the symptoms of denial follow suit. Indeed, the drug-induced simulacrum soon proves to be sticky, as the addict comes to deny her history, her disease, and, inevitably, her very self (White 1998 , McDowell & Spitz 1999 . Addicted denial is at its most pernicious when the denying addict refuses to see the obvious truth about herself: that she is an addict. At this stage, treatment is required in order to dismantle the addict's denial by confronting her with the reality of her progressive disease (Kearney 1996 , Lemanski 2001 . In this sense, recovery is not simply a matter of quitting drugs, as the common therapeutic term "dry drunk" suggests.' Instead, recovery is a matter of coming to terms with the self that is denied in active addiction. For example, writing from a cognitive behavioral perspective, Walters 1994 posits that because denial is the process of "projecting blame onto external situations, other people, or the capriciousness of fate," drug treatment So if addiction and denial are regarded as a matter of eluding internal realities in favor of blaming external ones, it is no surprise that the language of drug treatment is so inwardly focused. One might argue that talk therapy is a discipline that teaches clients to exchange the consumption of illegal substances for the ejection of linguistic substance, and in so doing, to trade simulacrum and denial for honesty and truth. Indeed, the discussion that follows shows how Fresh Beginnings therapists worked to help clients articulate the realities that they presumably once denied. However, it will be evident that "denial" is also a feature of clinical interactions and institutional relations in which the clinicians' truths enjoy automatic precedence over those of their clients.
"Secrets keep you sick"
Convinced that a client's verbal self-representations could circumvent her addicted will, program therapists agreed that denial was their greatest clinical challenge. Treatment literature at the program, distributed to affiliated staff and posted on bulletin boards at Cliff Street, admonished that "we must remember that denial is a major barrier to recovery." Clients, too, were regularly warned of the dangers of denial as therapists repeated the phrase "Secrets keep you sick" like a mantra.
At Fresh Beginnings, the "secret" was loaded with double entendre. Secrets left unrevealed were virulent because, much like Catholic confession, the naming of sins to an authorized audience was thought to heal the sinner.'2 However, since in the case of addiction secrets are thought to hide themselves from the confessant as well as the confessor, the ability to identify and reveal them is deemed all the more difficult. For instance, a Fresh Beginnings program description read, "Denial is a mechanism or process people use to protect themselves from something threatening by blocking their awareness ... [it] acts as a buffer against unacceptable reality." According to the therapist Susan, denial-infused talk is unlike the conscious linguistic strategies employed by clients seeking to trick their therapists: Strategically shifting from a seemingly impersonal statement of clinical fact (line 1) to a client animator who provides supportive evidence (line 3), Susan suggests that as an unwilling prevaricator, the denying addict exercises uncanny linguistic control that could enable her to pass a polygraph test with ease (line 9). However, Susan goes on to explain that the denier passes not because she exercises linguistic agency but precisely because she lacks it entirely, keeping her unnamed secrets from herself (line 7) as well as the truth-seeking therapist (line 10). It seems that the unflinching body and the unyielding words of the denying addict would pose an insurmountable challenge to therapists charged with reading their clients for signs of addiction. However, in an interview with the therapist Laura, I learned that the concept of denial aided rather hindered therapists in their efforts to line up clients' words with inner truths: (2) 1 R: And the thing about [denial] is when a person does something that they 2 know is unacceptable, 3 I: umhm 4 R: and risk of admitting to that is so great, it is truly possible that they don't 5 remember doing it. 6 I: OK. 7 R: And it's not a lie and it's not a pretense, it's "I'm not gonna remember this 8 until it's safe to remember it" and one of the things that happened a lot in 9 treatment is people's memory would start coming back and they would 10 remember a lot of stuff. And it's not that they were timin' it (chuckle) and I 1 stuff like that. It just wasn't safe at the time for them to remember. And 12 that happened with a number of our clients.
Laura, like her colleague Susan, takes pains to differentiate lies and pretenses (line 7) from denial (line 1). However, Laura's denier seems to tick to a more agentive clock, awaiting a safe time (line 8) to recognize and release the shameful referents of her memory. It is also notable that Laura conflates remembering (line 5) and admitting (line 4) as if there were no legitimate intervening variables between the two. According to Laura, when in the "safe" surrounds of treatment, the stuff (line 10) stored in clients' memories would not just start coming back (line 9), but would also, and seemingly automatically, start coming out in words.)3 Laura is also quick to acknowledge the great risks involved in remembering and admitting (line 4). Yet in casting drug treatment as a kind of temporal shelter for progressive remembering, she fails to address the most formidable risk facing her clients: that the unacceptable (line 2) contents of their admissions were regularly passed along in therapists' reports to the parole officers, Child Protective Service (CPS) workers, and HFC case managers to whom all Fresh Beginnings clients were also subject. For example, a client who spoke of a recent relapse could expect her words to travel outside the "safe" bounds of group therapy to the ears of a CPS worker with authority to take her children into state custody.
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Of course, many clients were cognizant of these risks and worked to edit their responses accordingly. However, if therapists detected such editorializing, they might well charge their clients with "compliance" -a sign of continued addiction.'4 Thus, the CPS worker could be called either way. Yet to the extent that Laura effectively casts the risks of admission as psychic rather than institutional, this linguistic double bind can be metalinguistically erased. After all, we see here that the fictive client knows (line 2) that her previous acts are unacceptable well before she puts them into words for her audience to judge them as such. Rather than risking admission (line 4), now effectively equated with self-recognition, the unconscious voice of the client consciously decides to deny, or to render unconscious what was once conscious (e.g., lines 7-8).
Yet if Laura's denier temporarily forgets the unacceptable acts she has shoved back in her mind, away from the signs that would betray them, Laura herself never doubts their existence; she waits patiently for the something (line 1), the it (line 8), the this (line 7) to be released into words. Here we have a clear illustration of the familiar Foucauldian assertion that the thrust of modem clinical authority is decidedly hermeneutic. Indeed, Laura's job here is not to judge her client (as we see, the client has already done that work, again in good Foucauldian form). Instead, Laura's job is to keep her analytical eye focused on the hidden, silent referent, ensuring that even though her clients' words may be false, they are never, ever empty.
HOW WE RECOVER: HONESTY, OPENNESS, WILLINGNESS
Letting it all hang out Because therapists were ultimately unable to verify the constative value of the CONTENTS of clients' narratives, believed to lie deep in their denial-prone psyches, they focused their efforts on promoting honest METHODS of speaking, proposing an explicit set of tenets for clean and healthy talk. Most prominently, the acronym HOW (Honesty, Openness, and Willingness) linked honesty as an ideal with a particular form of outward expression. Indeed, therapists relied on HOW as a metalinguistic baton with which to guide their clients' talk. In the hallways, offices, and therapy rooms at Cliff Street, therapists evoked HOW like a mantra, encouraging clients to use it as a semiotic token of recovery. During group therapy, Laura rewarded successful clients with "Certificates of Achievement" that read, for example, "For [Esther Smith] who is making a stronger commitment to her recovery, by demonstrating greater HOW (Honesty, Openness, and Willingness), and for working to raise her awareness." After the award ceremony, when I asked Esther why she received this particular recognition, she responded accordingly: "I tell it like it is, baby, I let it ALL hang out." Since, in line with Fresh Beginnings' language ideology, "honest" words were those that neatly corresponded with inner referents, one could simply "tell it like it is" if one was both open and willing to "let it all hang out."
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However, the practice of HOW was neither as straightforward nor as easy as Esther suggests, and therefore it merits further analytic attention. First, the question of how the acronym linked honesty and openness must be addressed. As Esther indicated, to be honest at Fresh Beginnings was to be open about what was (thought to be) "inside" -that is, one's feelings, memories, experiences, and desires. If honesty was a goal to be achieved, openness was the means of access. And openness was explicitly linked to articulation, inasmuch as one "opened oneself" to the extent that one opened one's mouth. As one former client, Keandra, offered: "Um, they helped me out a lot with opening up, because I was never one to VERBALIZE a lot of things."
Many clients, like Keandra, ostensibly agreed with their therapists that letting the "things" inside out in words was necessary if one hoped to recover from drug addiction. '5 Openness was not just an outward display of inner signs but a verbal indication of an inner state (honesty) freed from the hold of addicted denial. At Fresh Beginnings, the relationship between honesty and openness was a tight one; both clients and therapists repeatedly spoke of "opening up" as a NEED (lines 1, 2, 3 below), a requirement for recovery as well as a healthy inclination toward speech. For example, Tealie, whose tenure at Fresh Beginnings lasted six weeks, commented: Interestingly, Louise's acknowledgment of the troubling interactions of group therapy seemingly dissolves as she now describes the group as an open venue for her contributions (line 10). And while Louise explains her newfound willingness in terms of her own ability to relax and get into it (line 9), we might wonder how it is that the linguistic practices that she once found intrusive eventually "got into" her. As we see above, HOW was a way of denoting highly interactive linguistic exchanges that characterized group therapy in distinctly intrapsychic terms. In the end, Louise, along with her therapists, cast talk as a transparent medium of self-revelation rather than a strategic kind of social action. And while Louise's final statement implies that her openness welled up from inside, her laughter (lines 10, 1 1) may indicate recognition that Fresh Beginnings had no interest whatsoever in shutting her up (line 11).
The lexicon of Lila's love life
Although HOW delineated the prerequisites of truthful talk at Fresh Beginnings, the tenet of willingness remained a tricky one. As demonstrated above, HOW worked to open the client's will so that she could self-refer. Yet the very activation of the addicted will involved the inherent risk that it would be put to nonreferential tasks. For example, particularly seasoned clients practiced the art of what they called "flipping the script,"-that is, spinning a convincingly personalized narrative of willful recovery so as to camouflage a recent relapse or obscure a weekend binge from program staff. While therapists employed HOW in the positive as a metalinguistic guide to truthful talk, they also used the acronym as an admonishment to those whose will had gone astray. The case of Lila, a client who voluntarily left the program after a series of problematic interactions with her therapist,'6 exemplifies HOW's laborious semiotic reach.
I pieced together the story of how Lila left the program from a number of sources, including interviews with and documents written by Lila, Laura, and Lila's case manager.'7 According to this jointly constructed account, Lila returned to Cliff Street after a week-long holiday break, and during the first group therapy meeting, she told of a difficult and lonely Christmas, noting that she found some comfort in romantic time with a "friend." As she spoke, Lila referred repeatedly to her "friend" using the third person plural pronoun, a grammatical detail that was of much significance in the ensuing conflict.
In group, therapists greeted Lila's narrative with the usual array of gentle prompts, but they eventually homed in on the gender identity of the pluralpronouned "friend." In response, Lila persisted that the gender of her companion was irrelevant since she was more concerned with sorting through the causes of her loneliness than with detailing the incidental relief offered by her comforting friend. Days later, during their regularly scheduled individual session, Laura proposed an analytical link between Lila's use of the third person plural pronoun and stalled progress in recovery, grounding both in Lila's "unwillingness to be honest." In a later report to her supervisor, Laura wrote:
1 This client had been attempting to hide the gender of her romantic partner by 2 using the plural pronoun at times, and using male pronouns at other times 3 I reminded her that secrets keep us sick.
Laura's report readily highlights the analytical challenge posed by Lila's pronominal usage. As an absent referent that refuses the therapeutic present, Lila's they also refuses to be a ready-made indexical icon of inwardness -regardless of her intention in using it. Working within an ideological frame that insists on therapeutic reference, Laura must not only work to fill the semantic absence posed by the gender-neutral pronoun, glossing a spoken they as a real she; she LABOR IN A DRUG TREATMENT PROGRAM must also make present what has been left performatively absent in Lila's speech act: a deictic nomination of herself as a lesbian. Yet if Laura's letter lays out her dilemma, it also gives some sense of the very troubling solution. Here Lila's ambiguous plural pronoun, put in analytical interplay with a patently false male pronoun, is effectively rendered both a willful attempt to hide a real referent (line 1) and a "sick secret" (line 3).18 Indeed, with the ensuing support of her supervisor, Laura made clear that although Lila had not relapsed, her unwillingness to be "open" and "honest" about her sexualitywhich the plural-pronouned friend had now effectively come to represent -rendered her vulnerable to do so. Although Lila had tested negative for drug use for over a year and was moving successfully through phases of treatment, during her individual therapy session with Lila and in a later letter, Laura underscored, "As your chemical dependency counselor, I feel it is very important to remind you that 'secrets keep you sick'."
In response to her therapist's tenacious assertions, Lila maintained that her love life was her "private business" 19 and irrelevant to her progress in recovery. According to both Lila and Laura, the individual therapy session that was normally characterized by "open" sharing had become a formidable standoff. Indeed, later in their individual session, still working to elicit a she from Lila's lips, Laura resorted to what she later described as a "trick." She suggested to Lila that both her case manager and another therapist "suspected the truth" about Lila's sexuality because of her use of the third person plural pronoun. On the recorded voicemail of Lila's case manager, whom she called immediately after the meeting, Laura recounted: (6) 1 1 told her, I said "it's important for you to know that in all of your efforts 2 to conceal who you are involved with, you've created a great deal of attention 3 about this relationship. And I said, "and by using the plural pronoun, 4 you've led us all to assume that you were with a woman." 5 And that really freaked her out.
After expressing her initial shock (characterized in line 5 as a "freak-out") at such collective speculation in relation to pronomial usage, Lila eventually "slipped"20 and used the feminine pronoun, confirming Laura's suspicion.
Soon after this harrowing therapy session, Lila learned that Laura divulged to her case manager the contents of their therapy session, a move that she interpreted as both a violation of her privacy and explicitly counter to the program's confidentiality policies. Lila also began to suspect, rightly, that Laura had tricked her into identifying the gender identity of her friend. One week later, Lila made an appointment to tell Laura of her anger and disillusionment, which had culminated in a decision to leave the Fresh Beginnings program. At the meeting, Laura unsuccessfully attempted to dissuade Lila from transferring to a new program, but purportedly secured an agreement that Lila come to group one last time to Notably, at this point Lila can neither be accused of dishonesty regarding her drug use nor reprimanded for her failure to disclose the gender of her friend. Instead, Lila is admonished for her infelicitous promise to bid formal farewell to her fellow group members (line 1-2). Even after Lila's case manager tiled a grievance, which detailed Laura's own less than honest tactics, Laura's assertion that her client was guilty of failed honesty, openness, and willingness continued, not without irony. In her letter to Lila, Laura went so far as to write, "For you to decide to transfer to another program at this time suggests to me that you have relapsed and do not want others to know." Such a statement, of course, both circumvents Lila's expressed rationales for leaving the program and obscures Laura's culpability in precipitating her departure. Laura further insulates her analysis by suggesting that Lila be more open about how she is really feeling (line 4). Although Lila had been both loquacious and eloquent in expressing anger in relation to her therapist's actions, by qualifying Lila's feelings with the word really Laura implies that there is something spurious in her client's angry explanations.2' Laura's letter also mobilizes a discourse of need (line 3), suggesting to Lila that if she is only more honest (line 3) with her (new) therapist about her needs, the path to recovery will be far less difficult (line 6). Thus, in positing a needful "reality" -one that is INSIDE Lila and must be brought out in honest, open, and willing words if she hopes to recover -Laura is clearly laboring in line with the ideology of inner reference.
Laura's work in keying (Goffman 1974 ) her client's troubling words and actions in line with the "healthy" premises of inner reference is clearly aided by the metalinguistic tool HOW. In Laura's letter, Lila is not just encouraged to be more open with her feelings, but is explicitly urged to honestly and willingly verbalize those feelings to her new therapist. Significantly, the metalanguage of HOW effectively streamlines the identification of feelings (line 4) and the articulation of needs directly to a therapist (line 3), as if there were no intervening variables between the two. Laura is thereby able to signify Lila's expressed lack of trust as a trait that belongs to a still unhealthy client, rather than as an emanation of their disturbing interaction. Thus, when Laura writes The only way we recover is through 'Honesty, Openness and Willingness (HOW). 'It is now clear that this is very difficult for you" (lines 5-6), she effectively funnels a host of interactional dynamics into a failed, unrecovered you (lines 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 ).
LABOR IN A DRUG TREATMENT PROGRAM
Laura's analysis not only erases critical interactional dynamics22 but also obscures the institutional surrounds in which Lila's plural pronoun is uttered. For example, conspicuously missing from Laura's various analyses is acknowledgment of Lila's expressed concern that disclosing the gender of her partner would invite the disapproval of her peers, therapists, and case managers, threaten her employment as a client-intern,23 and damage her hard-won reputation as a senior client. And while Lila evidently shifts pronouns -perhaps strategically -in accordance with her spatiotemporal surrounds, Laura engages in a semiotic process that extracts Lila's they from these shifting surrounds and refixes them on the "inside" of Lila, so they appear purely denotational (see Silverstein 2004) . In this way, Laura labors to prevent what she determines to be a REAL SHE from becoming a felicitous THEY.24
More specifically, while Lila finally suggests that her they is an index of an institution that may not welcome the gender of her partner, Laura fixes Lila's gender-neutral pronoun as an icon of her presumed "gay shame."25 Indeed, what is perhaps most striking about Laura's communicative labors is how they analytically collapse the institution's need to "bring out" information regarding clients' sexuality into Lila's apparent clinical need to "come out" as a lesbian. In the assiduous work of lining up Lila's plural pronoun with an assumed inner "truth," Laura cannot hear Lila's multiple insinuations that the program is homophobic, leaving herself and the institution insulated from her client's developing critique. As events unfolded and Lila became more eloquent and loquacious, Laura ensured that her words would be taken up as institutional critique, bolstering her metalinguistic labor with a damning clinical diagnosis. In her response to the grievance filed against her, Laura wrote: "The client in question has a paranoid personality which has challenged all of her treatment team."
Lila did transfer to another program, and she continued to express regret, hurt, and surprise at the circumstances of her departure while maintaining friendships with several clients still attending the program. Several years after this incident, while working as a travel agent, Lila died of a heart attack. Fresh Beginnings and HFC staff suspected a drug overdose. Talk of shame quietly persisted.
CONCLUSIONS: HEALING AND SEALING
The talking cure is based on the assumption that words can do much more than refer to sick selves; they can also produce healthier ones. In fact, With this in mind, I wish neither to indict talk therapies per se, nor even to challenge the idea that one must refer if one hopes to produce. Instead, I am concerned with the political effects of a language ideology that allows people's words only two referential possibilities in relation to a single property: revealing or denying inner truth. By following the fate of Lila's plural pronoun, we can see that such an ideology, when mobilized as a clinical regimen, severely circumscribes the truths that she can felicitously produce. And, although it would be quite easy to focus on Laura as an unusually power-hungry and manipulative therapist, we would be wise to note that her troubling analysis of Lila's they survived long intertextual travels through a large network of people dedicated to helping others.
If the linguistic analyst were to follow in Fresh Beginnings' footsteps, she might take therapists' and clients' metalinguistic reports, gleaned during her research, as transparent and conclude that honest talk will indeed heal the addicted speaker. After all, Louise enthusiastically reports that "talking it out" is healthier than "acting it out," trading in her resistant "philosophy" for honest, open, and willing talk. If clients feel better after using the language of inner reference, we might well laud it for accomplishing its therapeutic aims. However, as the case of Lila poignantly illustrates, our analysis of clinical language should not stop here, complacent with such seeming psychic triumphs. Indeed, if, our linguistic analyses are to be useful in the clinic, they must draw attention to the situatedness of clients' talk and investigate the linguistic relationship between cure and context.
As both an anthropologist and a social worker, I am dedicated to thinking through the political effects of very common ideas about language. Here, working against the ideology of inner reference, I attempt to do what Lila, as a client at Fresh Beginnings, could not: to connect her words felicitously with her institutional and social surrounds. For if we are to include in our definition of "health" an ability to act and speak as a political agent, we should recognize the ways in which clients' words "refer" to the conventional, spatiotemporal, and interactive contexts of their articulation. We should also recognize the grave danger in leaving such critical indices unheard. am trying to be a "good anthropologist" and a "good client organizer," worrying about the political effects of clinical practices.) Thus, our best question might not be "Why did the therapist do/say that?" but instead, "What else can she, in that time and place, (felicitously) say or do?" My thanks to Janet Hart, Webb Keane, and James Wilce for their encouragement explicitly to address this issue, which I have pursued at greater length elsewhere.
9 As Derrida effectively argues, the addict is considered problematic precisely because she cuts ties with the world and escapes into simulacrum: "We do not object to the drug user's pleasure per se, but to a pleasure taken in an experience without truth" (1993:236). In opposition to the Platonic subject who gains his authenticity through his productive interactions in the life of the community, the drug addict "produces nothing, nothing true or real" ( 1 993:236) and instead takes in, injects, and inhales, epitomizing the unproductive citizen. Thus, if drug addiction involves succumbing to an alternate reality and losing touch with one's self, drug treatment must draw the addict back into the realities of modern productive, healthy, and individuated selfhood.
10 Reed 1985 posits that women suffer less than men from denial, and many gender-sensitive programs have taken this proposition into account. For example, Women for Sobriety (WFS), a women-centered self-help alternative to AA, suggests that addiction is a matter of "faulty thinking" rather than denial (see Kaskutas 1989 Kaskutas , 1992 1 1 A "dry drunk" is one who continues to behave like an addict -for example, denying her problems and shirking responsibility for them -while having discontinued actual alcohol or drug use. 12 Indeed, while confession seems simply to refer to the sins of the sinner and, in this sense, is an exemplary ideological instance of inner reference, it is precisely because it refers that it so dramatically transforms (Carr n.d.).
'3 Silverstein & Urban 1996 propose that ritualization is a transaction between entextualization (the making of relatively stable, presupposable texts) and contextualization, and the accommodation of those texts to a particular spatiotemporal environ. In this passage, we can see that the contextualization of clients' speech (in the therapy room, for example) was dependent on a prior process of iconicization that had already rendered signs to be spoken as properties internal to the speaker. Indeed, thanks to a semiotic process by which the indexical features of a speech act are reduced to a presupposed and re-supposed (or reified) "here and now" (see Silverstein 2004) , Laura can assert that the "stuff" of memory "comes back" to the client speaker and simply "comes out" in words. (An alternative metalinguistic claim might be that clients' elicited admissions produced particular kinds of "memories" that indexed cultural and clinical conventions, particular institutional demands, etc. -a claim that would clearly trouble the ideological premises of inner reference.) 14 "Compliance," a clinical term popularized by the psychiatrist Harry Tiebout, an early avid supporter of AA, denotes a linguistic proclivity considered to be both specific to and rampant among addicts: the tendency to produce utterances devoid of the referential content that they effectively proclaim.
15 While HOW, as a pithy maxim, neatly consolidated a set of complicated and highly disciplined rules about how Fresh Beginnings clients should talk, it could not account for the multitudinous ways in which clients actually used language in practice. As Wittgenstein 1953 proposed, leaming how to use a language is a lot like learning how to play a game. At Fresh Beginnings, the rules of the language game were established by the ideology of inner reference, and client players soon learned that the only "moves" they could legally make, or statements they could legitimately utter, were ones that abided by the rules of inner reference. However, as clients were consistently confronted with the limits of the "moves" their words could make at Fresh Beginnings, some began to question the nature of the game. Thus, just like chess players who anticipate their opponents' moves and maneuver accordingly, some clients developed a linguistic strategy to trump their therapist opponents. As client players practiced the game of inner reference, they not only learned to read and anticipate their opponents' moves, telling them what they wanted or expected to hear; some clients also began to LABOR IN A DRUG TREATMENT PROGRAM decipher and ultimately learned to circumvent the rules of inner reference. Elsewhere (Carr in preparation) I describe the conditions under which clients learned how to engage in such linguistic ingenuity, and while this essay focuses on linguistic constraints, recognition of such strategic ingenuity is essential to fully understanding the individual voice in language (see Johnstone 2000). 16 As previously noted, because clients' success in the program was so often linked with their housing, their parole requirements, and/or custody of their children, very few clients who were in good status left Fresh Beginnings voluntarily. As far as I know, there were only three such cases (including Lila) among the more than 50 clients who filtered through the program during the course of this study.
17 Revelant data were obtained from both Lila and Laura. In addition to the letters that Laura wrote Lila, I obtained a written exchange from Lila's case manager, who objected to Laura's handling of the case and filed a formal grievance, and Laura's ten-page response to her supervisors. Both documents (which Laura gave to me after she left the program) included verbatim transcriptions of relevant verbal exchanges between the two parties. In fact, the case manager's grievance included a two-page transcription of a message that Laura had left on her voicemail. In her grievance, the case manager's report of Laura's speech was damning, needing little coterminous commentary, and Laura was eventually disciplined by her supervisor for breach of client confidentiality.
18 A similar linguistic bind is described by Young 1995 in his study of a specialized psychiatric unit for Vietnam veterans. In group therapy, patients' linguistic and paralinguistic behaviors are analytically funneled into categories of flaunted secret and healthy disclosure, though "stress reaction" rather than "denial" acts as the funneling modality.
19 Lila's use of the term "business" may be of some significance. In contrast to Laura's categorization of sexuality as a state, Lila (who had been romantically involved with both men and women) portrays her sexual life as a matter of practice and desire, both of which are decidedly private. This epistemological difference inflected the ongoing conflict, as Laura accused Lila of "shame" about "who she was" and Lila responded with surprise at what she saw as Laura's voyeurism into her "private business." 20 Such "slips" pose an analytical challenge, burdened as they are by Freudian presumptions of deep desire finding linguistic escape on the one hand, and the reification of intentional language choice as exemplary of human consciousness in action. Moving beyond this dichotomy, Jane Hill builds on Goffman 1978 to suggest that dysfluencies do not emanate from a Freudian unconscious or an authentic, buried self. To the contrary, "the self which produces these is a responsible self which attends to precise representation" (Hill 1995:135) . 21 Notably, at Fresh Beginnings, anger was considered both endemic to addicts and a false emotion that covered up the "real" feelings that are denied in active addiction. Against the backdrop of denial, this view of anger helps both to cast Lila's rationales for leaving the program as evidence of continued addiction and discursively to erase Laura's actions from the scene. 22 Irvine & Gal (2000:38) explain that language ideologies must ignore or transform elements that do not fit into their interpretive structures. According to them, this "erasure" is one of three semiotic processes that sustain a given language ideology, the others being iconization and fractal recursivity. My discussion builds from this work by suggesting that the "erasure" of spatiotemporal indexes of clients' talk is achieved by an a priori process of iconization (see also Carr n.d.).
23 Some HFC programs had consumer intern programs in which former clients were hired into the organization, usually in low-skilled, low-wage, high-turnover positions. Lila's case was a bit of an exception, since she was still attending Fresh Beginnings when she was hired, causing much ado among some staff members regarding the propriety of resultant "boundaries." 24 Benveniste 1971 distinguishes third person pronouns, which can exist independently of the "I" who utters them, and first and second person pronouns, which depend on and "shift" according to situation in which they are uttered (cf. Silverstein 1976). He writes: "The third person must not [therefore] be imagined as a person suited to depersonalization. There is no apheresis of the person; it is exactly the non-person, which possesses as its sign the absence of that which specifically qualifies the "I" and the "you" (1971:200). Arguably, Lila takes advantage of the absence using they as a "shifter." Yet to the extent that Laura's analytical labor is successful, Lila's once "shifting" pronoun falls victim to what Silverstein 2004 calls "indexical iconic semiosis," a process that collapses the spatiotemporal properties of signs so that they appear independent of their context and purely denotational. We might render Laura and Lila's respective labor as follows:
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Speech Act
Reception/Analysis Lx production Laura "they" she I (deictic) Lesbian (referent) Shame (qualifier) "They" =she = "I am (shameful) lesbian " Lila "they" friend ?
"They "=friend= "you are/this place is homophobic" (?) " They "=friend = "what are you going to do with my 'they'?" (?) "They"= request for diplomatic nonidexicality (Silverstein, 1976) (?) "They'=sheI= am a (shameful) lesbian (?) 25 As clients progressed through treatment, therapists reasoned that it was not just denial but also shame that prevented clients from articulating their histories, especially as those histories related to sexual experiences. Therapists, in line with their colleagues in women's treatment (e.g., Finkelstein 1996, Winick et al. 1992), posited that shame was one of the "three emotions that [are] most likely trigger relapse" in addicted women. (Laura identified the other two emotions as fear and anger.) Arguably, the story of Lila demonstrates how "gay shame" can be semiotically conferred. Along these lines, Tompkins 1995 likens shame to a yawn, passed from one agent to another in mysterious sociality. According to Tompkins, shame becomes an individual attribute only because it is understood as such, just as the yawn is interpreted as a sign that the yawner is tired rather than as a reflexive expression of mutuality.
